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Taxing Income From
Unlawful Activities*
Boris I. Bittkert
In a series of cases dating back to the 1920's, the Supreme Court
has considered whether earnings derived from unlawful activities con-
stitute taxable income. After tracing the development of this case
law, Professor Bittker asserts that the federal income tax statutes
have contained no clear congressional mandate on this issue and
that therefore the question may appropriately be resolved from a
policy standpoint. Professor Bittker admits that some of the argu-
ments against taxability, such as the potential for discriminatory
enforcement and the possibility of prejudice to the defendant at trial,
have merit, but he contends that these problems can be solved short
of immunizing from tax all illegal profits and concludes that the
optimal rule is to tax the net income from any unlawful activity.
I. INTRODUCTION
I N 1931, Al Capone, the most publicized racketeer of the 1920's,
was prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced to 11 years in pri-
son for federal income tax evasion.' The average citizen was
probably satisfied with this termination of Capone's career, even if
tax evasion seemed to be a minor offense when compared with the
other crimes attributed to him by the press. But the disparity
troubled many other observers. To -them the -tax charge was only
a pretext used by government officials who could not prove that
Capone had committed the murders and other gangland crimes im-
puted to him, but who were either too incompetent to gather the
necessary evidence or too supine to defy public opinion by clearing
his reputation. Some of these critics were also bothered by the use
of federal law to prosecute a man whose "real" crimes violated state
and local law. These criticisms were weakened by the undeniable
fact that a person can be guilty of federal tax evasion even though
he is also guilty, suspected, or innocent of state and local offenses.
But this response did not entirely satisfy the critics who sensed that
* @ 1974 by Boris I. Bittker. This article is part of a larger study in
progress.
j Sterling Professor of Law, Yale University. B.A., Cornell Univer-
sity, 1938; LL.B., Yale University, 1941.
1. J. KOBLER, CAPONE: THE LIFE AND WORLD OF AI. CAPONE (1971);
K. ALIsoP, THE BOOTLEGGERS AND TmR ER& (1961).
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Capone's reputation-rather than any provable wrongdoing-had
led the Treasury to launch its implacable search for evidence of tax
evasion, -and who also realized that the same suspicions might have
prejudiced the jury against him. Thus, latent in the prosecution of
Al Capone was an issue that became the subject of intense examina-
tion by the United States Supreme Court in later years: Do the
fruits of unlawful activity constitute taxable "income," as that term
was used by Congress when it enacted the federal income tax stat-
utes?
II. Is INCOME FROM UNLAWFUL ACTMTY TAXABLE?
The sixteenth amendment authorizes Congress to tax "incomes,
from whatever source derived." In 1913, when Congress first exer-
cised its authority under the sixteenth amendment, it imposed a tax
on net income from a variety of sources, including "any lawful busi-
ness carried on for gain or profit."12 Three years later, Congress
eliminated the qualifying word "lawful" from the statute without
saying why the change was made.3
With the advent of Prohibition, the Treasury relied on this un-
explained change in the law when prosecuting bootleggers for fail-
ing to report their income from the unlawful sale of liquor. In
several litigated cases, the courts acknowledged that taxing an ac-
tivity seemed inconsistent with prohibiting it,4 ,and that it might
be thought degrading for the government to become a "silent
partner" in an unlawful business by taxing its profits.5 Even so,
the courts were not willing to conclude that Congress intended to
exempt income from unlawful activities. As one appellate court,
in Sullivan v. United States,6 put the point:
It does not satisfy one's sense of justice to tax persons in
legitimate enterprises, and allow those who thrive by vio-
lation of the law to escape. It does not seem likely that
Congress intended to allow an individual to set up his own
wrong in order to avoid taxation, and thereby increase the
2. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § 2B, 38 Stat. 167 (emphasis added).
3. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 2(a), 39 Stat. 757 (now INT. REv.
CODE OF 1954, § 61).
4. See, e.g., Steinberg v. United States, 14 F.2d 564, 566 (2d Cir. 1926).
But see United States v. Stafoff, 260 U.S. 477, 480 (1922), imposing an ex-
cise tax on liquor prohibited by the National Prohibition Act: "Of course
Congress may tax what it also forbids."
5. See, e.g., Steinberg v. United States, 14 F.2d 564, 569 (2d Cir. 1926)
(Manton, J., concurring), quoted at text accompanying note 33 infra.
6. 15 F.2d 809 (4th Cir. 1926), rev'd, 274 U.S. 259 (1927).
19741
132 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
burdens of others lawfully employed. The problem which
Congress had to consider was not so simple as that pre-
sented by the case of one whose entire income is earned
in a business which offends against a national law of uni-
form application. Activities lawful in one state of the
Union may be unlawful in another. The operations of indi-
vidual men in the prosecution of their business enter-
prises are sometimes within and sometimes without the
pale of the law. Great aggregations of capital, which have a
place in the popular mind, far above the sordid level of
the illicit distiller, and the common criminal, sometimes
find it profitable to ignore the laws of the state or of the
nation. The complexities of the situation are without
number. Can it be said that in all such cases Congress
intended to tax the law-abiding, and let the criminal go
free?
7
The court's answer to its own question was a surprising com-
promise. It held that the bootlegger's income was taxable, but that
the privilege against self-incrimination, granted by the fifth amend-
ment, protected him against prosecution for failing to file a tax re-
turn that required disclosure of his illegal activities. As a practical
matter, this decision evidently meant that the government could
collect taxes from a bootlegger if it could prove, without aid from
him, how much income he received, but that no criminal penalties
could be imposed unless he filed a demonstrably false return instead
of none at all.
When the Treasury appealed this decision to the Supreme Court,
however, it got a more palatable result. Expressing no embarrass-
ment about letting -the government share in the profits of an unlaw-
ful business, the Court said curtly: "We see no reason . . .why
the fact that a business is unlawful should exempt it from paying
the taxes that if lawful it would have to pay."18 The opinion (by
Mr. Justice Holmes) used only a few more words to dispose of the
defendant's claim that the fifth amendment exempted him from fil-
ing a return:
Most of the items [called for by the return] warranted
no complaint. It would be an extreme if not an extrava-
gant application of the Fifth Amendment to say that it
authorized a man to refuse to state the amount of his in-
come because it had been made in crime. But if the de-
fendant desired to test that or any other point he should
have tested it in the return so that it could be passed
7. 15 F.2d at 811. See also Steinberg v. United States, 14 F.2d 564 (2d
Cir. 1926).
$. United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 263 (1927).
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upon. He could not draw a conjurer's circle around the
whole matter by his own declaration that to write any word
upon the government blank would bring him into danger of
the law.9
Although the Sullivan case was decided by the Supreme Court
in 1927, the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination, so far
as tax returns are concerned, remains unclear to this day. When
income from unlawful activities is reported, the taxpayer often sup-
plies his name, address, and net income (usually in round figures,
with such laconic labels as "miscellaneous income" or "income from
various sources") and leaves the rest of the return blank. Returns
that are this terse invite intensive scrutiny by the Internal Revenue
Service, but taxpayers are rarely prosecuted for failing to supply
more information, either because the fifth amendment is thought to
protect them against making further disclosures or because juries are
not likely to convict for mere silence. Instead, revenue agents en-
deavor to verify the amounts listed on the tax return by reconstruct-
ing the taxpayer's financial history-his purchases, investments,
loans, and so on.
The scope of the Sullivan opinion was cloudy in another re-
spect. It may be that the customers of the defendant in that case,
having purchased bootleg liquor from him voluntarily, were not en-
titled under state law to get their money back. Thus, the Supreme
Court did not speak explicitly to the taxability of an unlawful acti-
vity in which the wrongdoer can be compelled by his victims to dis-
gorge the fruits of his crime (e.g., embezzlement or burglary).
Can he be said to realize "income," in view of his obligation to pay
back whatever he has taken? Should he be treated like a person
who borrows from a bank, and is not taxed on the borrowed funds
because he has a duty to repay the loan?
When the Supreme Court first addressed this issue, in Commis-
sioner v. Wilcox'0 it accepted the "borrower" analogy and held
(with one Justice dissenting) that embezzled funds are not taxable:
[riaxable income [does not] accrue from the mere re-
ceipt of property or money which one is obliged to return
or repay to the rightful owner, as in the case of a loan
or credit ....
. . . Moral turpitude is not a touchstone of taxability.
The question, rather, is whether the taxpayer in fact re-
ceived a statutory gain, profit or benefit. That the tax-
9. Id. at 263-64.
10. 327 U.S. 404 (1946).
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payer's motive may have been reprehensible or the mode
of receipt illegal has no bearing on the application of [the
taxing statute]."
In support of this holding, the Court asserted that the victim's
chance of recovering from the wrongdoer would be jeopardized if
the wrongdoer were required to pay part of the embezzled funds
to satisfy his tax liability. In point of fact, the defendant in Wilcox
had dissipated the embezzled funds in gambling, and hence could
probably not reimburse his victim's losses. But the Court held that
this fact was irrelevant: "[Taxability is determined from the
circumstances surrounding the receipt and holding of the money
rather than by the disastrous use to which it is put."'12 The Court
left open the possiblity that the embezzler would become taxable
if he retained the funds until his obligation to repay was terminated
by the statute of limitations or by an act of forgiveness on the part
of the victim.
Six years later, the Supreme Court had to decide whether the
defendant in Rutkin v. United States'a was taxable on $250,000 ex-
torted by him from an ex-partner in a "high seas venture" (i.e.,
bootlegging) by threats to kill the victim and his family. In theory,
extortion resembles embezzlement in imposing an obligation on the
wrongdoer to reimburse his victim on demand. But in practice an
extortioner is less likely to be asked for repayment; if the victim's
fear of exposure or violence keeps him from complaining to the
police when he is first approached, he will probably remain silent
thereafter. For this reason, the Supreme Court held in the Rutkin
case that extorted funds are taxable:
An unlawful gain, as well as a lawful one, constitutes
taxable income when its recipient has such control over
it that, as a practical matter, he derives readily realizable
economic value from it. . . . That occurs when cash, as
here, is delivered by its owner to the taxpayer in a manner
which allows the recipient freedom to dispose of it at will,
even though it may have 'been obtained by fraud and his
freedom to use it may be assailable by someone with a
better title to it.' 4
This decision evoked a vigorous dissent by four of the nine Justices,
who could see no valid distinction between embezzled and extorted
funds:
11. Id. at 408.
12. Id. at 409.
13. 343 U.S. 130 (1952).
14. Id. at 137,
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We ... pointed out [in the Wilcox case] that the em-
bezzler had no bona fide legal or equitable claim to the
money, was under a definite legal obligation to return it
to its rightful owner, and consequently had no more re-
ceived the kind of "gain" or "income" which Congress has
taxed than if he had merely borrowed money. One who
extorts money not owed him stands in this precise situa-
tion. He has neither legal nor equitable claim to the ex-
torted money and is under a continuing obligation to re-
turn it to its owner. 15
The dissenters were not prepared, however, to extend the "bor-
rower" analogy to criminal activity that was sufficiently sustained
and regular to constitute a "business." Acknowledging that "some
states have laws which under special circumstances permit some par-
ticular groups to assert a legal claim for recovery of gambling losses
or money paid for bootleg liquor,"'16 they asserted that "bootleggers
and gamblers are engaged in going businesses and make regular
business profits which should be taxed in the same manner as pro-
fits made through more legitimate endeavors.' 7  If such a taxpayer
actually makes a refund to a customer, the dissenting Justices would
allow him to deduct -the amount when paid (just as an ordinary
businessman can deduct refunds to customers victimized by false ad-
vertising or other improper business practices); all other receipts of
an unlawful "business" would be taxable despite the theoretical obli-
gation to make restitution. Thus, it was only the "sporadic loot of
an embezzler, an extortioner or a robber"'.8 that these Justices would
have exempted from tax.
It is not clear whether the line between "business profits" and
"sporadic loot" was to be based on the type of unlawful activity
engaged in by the taxpayer, or the number of transactions. If an
amateur bootlegger was obligated by state law to make refunds to
his infrequent customers, would they tax his profits as "business in-
come" or exempt them as "sporadic loot"? Conversely, if the defen-
dant in the Rutkin case had decided to make a career of extortion,
would the dissenting Justices have classified his profits as taxable
"business income" rather than tax-exempt "sporadic loot"?
Though they left these questions unanswered, the dissenters' pre-
diction that the majority's distinction in the Rutkin case between
embezzlement and extortion was not viable proved to be correct.
15. Id. at 139-40.
16. Id. at 140.
17. Id. at 140-41.
18. Id. at 141.
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136 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Less than 10 years later, in Yames v. United States19 (involving a
union official who had embezzled more than $700,000 from his
union and a related insurance company), the Court announced that
income from illegal activity is taxable despite the recipient's legal
obligation to make restitution. The offsetting liability should be dis-
regarded, according to Mr. Chief Justice Warren, because the tax-
payer himself does not intend to honor this obligation and because
"as a practical matter" he has enough control over the funds to de-
rive economic value from them. 20  The majority in James went on
to say that if the taxpayer actually made restitution to his victim,
he would be entitled to a deduction in the year of repayment. Save
for ambiguous cases in which the wrongdoer succeeds in persuading
the Internal Revenue Service or the courts that he "borrowed" the
disputed funds and intended to repay them, the James case evident-
ly embraces all illegal receipts. Three Justices dissented on the
ground that the Wilcox case correctly interpreted the Internal
Revenue Code in holding that no "income" is realized by an em-
bezzler, and two of the three implied that the same principle should
be applied to funds obtained by extortion.2 1
Throughout this tortuous judicial history, the Justices have
agreed in principle that Congress did not intend to differentiate be-
tween honest and dishonest taxpayers, and that "income" is taxable
whether generated by legal or illegal activities. Once accepted, this
principle could be easily applied if the wrongdoer had no obligation
to repay his profits (e.g., gambling profits realized by a professional
gambler in a game with other professionals). But no case actually
came before the Court with an explicit finding that the taxpayer
was free of any offsetting liability, and ordinarily the wrongdoer is
obligated to make restitution to the victim (or, in some circum-
stances, to the state). Much can be said, however, for the approach
of the James case, which disregards the wrongdoer's theoretical duty
19. 366 U.S. 213 (1961).
20. Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670, 678 (1933), established that, in the
case of the honest taxpayer, tax liability can rest on the enjoyment of sub-
stantial benefit from the funds.
21. Six of the Justices on the James Court dissented from at least part
of the plurality's decision to overrule Wilcox but to apply the new rule to
criminal prosecutions only if arising thereafter. Dissenting from the plural-
ity's decision to overrule were Justices Black, Douglas, and Whittaker, 366
U.S. at 225-41, 248-58. Justices Black and Douglas added that if Wilcox
could not be reconciled with Rutkin, where the Court had held that an extor-
tioner's income was taxable, it was the latter case that should be overruled.
Id. at 240.
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to make repayment because it is disregarded by him22 and rarely
results in a refund to the victim. Even the dissenters accept this
approach in the case of criminal activity that can be classified as
a regular business.23 The James rationale equates illegal and legal
income in the sense that the taxpayer must report both types of in-
come on receipt, but can then deduct any amounts that are actually
refunded.
II. SHOULD ILLEGAL INCOME BE TAXED?
All of these Supreme Court decisions, culminating in the James
case, purport to interpret the word "income" as used by Congress
in enacting the federal income tax statutes; the issue to be decided
was what Congress intended to do about the receipts of unlawful
activity, not what would be wise public policy. But explicit clues
to the legislative intent were lacking, and the opinions are suffused
with a concern with broader issues, a concern that reflects a clash
of opinion about how the profits of illegal activity ought to be
treated. In approaching this ultimate question, it may be helpful
to start with two simple points.
The first is that a dollar of profit from unlawful activity will
buy just as much as a dollar of lawful profit. The comparison is
obvious enough -when the lawbreaker has no obligation to surrender
his profit; but even if there is such a duty, he is at least as well
off as a -businessman who sells his merchandise on a money-back-
if-not-satisfied guarantee, knowing from experience -that few if any
customers will demand a refund. When the receipts of a lawful
business are subject to offsetting obligations of this type, the com-
pany is taxed on the aggregate amount received. It is not allowed
to exclude the receipts from income on the theory that the full
amount may have to be repaid to its customers (in the way
borrowed funds are excluded because of the offsetting liability to
make repayment), because this contingency is too unlikely to
occur.24 Instead, any amounts that are actually repaid are deduct-
ible when the payments are made.
22. Occasionally a wrongdoer, such as an embezzler who is caught in
flagrante, agrees to make repayment, usually to forestall prosecution or to mit-
igate the penalty. When this occurs in the same year as the wrongful act,
the receipts have been held to be nontaxable. Wilbur Buff, 58 T.C. 224
(1972).
23. Id. at 254-55.
24. Even if experience provides the basis for a reliable estimate of the
amount that will have to be refunded, the taxpayer cannot establish a tax-
deductible reserve against such future expenses, but must instead deduct them
1974]
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The second point is that the term "income from illegal activity"
is not self-defining. Income can be derived from a much wider
range of unlawful activities than the bootlegging, embezzlement, and
extortion that came before the Supreme Court in the cases summar-
ized in the preceding section. The taxpayer may derive economic
benefit from peripheral misconduct in a business that is entirely law-
ful (such as a corporate officer's illegal use, of inside information
in purchasing his company's stock), from an unlawful enterprise that
could 'be conducted (though perhaps less profitably) in conformity
to law (such as a mail-order business that persistently engages in
false advertising), or from behavior that is wholly unrelated to any
legitimate enterprise (such as murder-for-hire). The unlawful ac-
tivity may be confined to a single act of misconduct, which the tax-
payer does not intend to repeat; it may consist of behavior that
would have been repeated if it had not been detected by the police;
or it may constitute a continuous business. The profits may, or may
not, be refundable to the victim; if neither party to an unlawful act
is a victim (e.g., bribery of a public official), the government may
have a right to recover the fruits of the crime, and there may be
other cases in which the status of the unlawful profit is not defined
by law. The behavior. may be punishable by fine and imprison-
ment, or it may be unlawful only in the sense that the courts will
order restitution or impose civil penalties. Whether the penalties
are criminal or civil, the misconduct may be abhorrent to society
and energetically prosecuted by the police, or it may be tolerated
or even patronized by "respectable" segments of society.
The dissenting Justices in the Rutkin and James cases proposed
to distinguish between the "regular business profits" of a bootlegger
or professional gambler, which they regarded as taxable, and the
"sporadic loot" of embezzlers, extortioners, and robbers, which they
would not include in "income." But it is difficult to justify such a
differentiation, and even more difficult to see how it could be effec-
tively administered. Unlawful receipts are of equal economic value
to the recipient whether they are sporadic or regular, and they are
equally likely to be retained or spent by him. In any event, the
full range of the taxpayer's unlawful activities, which would deter-
mine whether he is engaged in a "regular business" or only in "spo-
radic" criminal activities, will ordinarily not be known. Unless he
has been convicted in a separate criminal case, the only evidence
when, as, and if they are paid. See B. BrrrKR & L. STONE, FEDERAL IN-
coz¢m, EsTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 837-41 (4th ed. 1972).
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in the tax case may 'be that his expenditures substantially exceeded
the income reported on his tax returns, and that he was reputed
to be a gambler, thief, corrupt public official, or loan shark. For
these reasons, it would be very difficult to administer a distinction
between one type of illegal income and another, whether it is based
on the regularity of the receipts, the morality of the behavior, the
existence of a legal duty to make restitution, or the severity of the
penalties. On the other hand, a blanket exemption for all unlawful
income would embrace not only the neighborhood thief and boot-
legger, but also a much broader range of taxpayers, including busi-
nessmen whose profits are attributable to violations of antitrust and
price control laws, health, safety, environmental, labor, and racial
standards, and other governmental regulations.
A major theme in the debate over taxing income from unlawful
activity is that it will not be accurately reported by its recipients,
no matter what the Internal Revenue Code provides, and that they
will conceal or destroy all records of their income and assets and
invoke the fifth amendment when asked for information. As a re-
sult, the Treasury will have to engage in costly investigations in an
effort to enforce the law, with no assurance that the taxes actually
collected will exceed its expenses. Since, it is argued, such an en-
forcement program is more likely to lose than to make money, it
will be employed mainly or solely as a device to harass or prosecute
persons suspected, perhaps on the basis of mere rumor or hearsay,
of committing other crimes.
In one of the early bootlegger cases, the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit accepted this explanation of the income tax pro-
secution before it:
It hardly needs mention that the record before us,
common knowledge of prosecuting methods, and the com-
ment of the court in sentencing [the defendant] clearly
show that [he] was indicted, not to enforce a revenue
law, nor penalize him for failing to comply with one, but to
punish severely for dealing largely in liquor. . . . [T]he
prohibition statute makes no difference between the sale,
possession, or transportation of a bottle of liquor, and the
same acts in relation to a shipload; wherefore, as Congress
has furnished weapons appropriate for frontal attack only
against small fry, endeavor is made to net the larger fish
in the meshes of revenue, customs, and =ax laws, with the
ever-useful conspiracy statute in reserve for a plurality of
wrongdoers. The question is not whether this is wise or
politic, fair or in good taste, but whether it can legally
1974]
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be done. We think it can under the language of the stat-
utes, and know that similar things have been done for
generations. 25
While these sentiments were evidently put forth in a spirit of resig-
nation if not serenity, often there is an attitude of queasiness about
what might be called the "Al Capone syndrome."
It would be fatuous to deny that taxpayers with income
from unlawful activities are sometimes selected for intensive tax
audit because they are suspected by officials of the Treasury or Jus-
tice Departments of violating nontax laws, 26 but it would be equally
fatuous to overlook the many taxpayers with the same type of in-
come whose returns come -to the surface in the course of routine
tax investigations. A blanket tax exemption for income from un-
lawful activities would apply to both groups, including, as pointed
out above, numerous taxpayers with income from violations of anti-
trust, usury, fair advertising, health, and price control laws, whose
tax returns are often selected for examination for reasons unrelated
to their misconduct, under standards uniformly applied to all tax-
payers. Exempting income that flows from an unlawful source in
order to discourage discriminatory law enforcement is a needlessly
blunt instrument. To use a term that is currently popular among
constitutional lawyers, it is "overinclusive."
But it is simultaneously underinclusive. The disease that pro-
duces the "Al Capone syndrome" is discriminatory enforcement of
the law, whose victims can include political enemies as well as per-
sons suspected of engaging in criminal misconduct. Exempting the
income of the latter group will do nothing for their fellow victims.
A remedy is required that will discourage discriminatory law en-
forcement, without regard to sources from which its victims derive
their income. The most drastic remedy would be a grant of tax
immunity to anyone whose return was selected for audit in an ir-
regular fashion; slightly less draconic would be a forbidden-fruit
doctrine, under which the Treasury could assess a deficiency against
a person whose return was improperly selected for examination only
upon proof that the same deficiency would have been assessed if
the return had been processed in a routine manner.
25. Steinberg v. United States, 14 F.2d 564, 566-67 (2d Cir. 1926).
26. For a discussion of the organized crime drive during President Ken-
nedy's administration, see V. NAVASKY, KINNFDY JUSTIcE 42-95 (1971). Na-
vasky states that one of the prosecutors was described by a colleague as will-
ing "to indict a man for spitting on the sidewalk if he thought that was the
best [charge] he could get [against him]." Id. at 53.
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Still another point needs to be made about the "Al Capone syn-
drome." While it is easy and proper to condemn use of the tax
laws to punish someone whose "real" crime is embezzlement or
black marketeering, it is difficult to decide when this has happened.
Enough pillars of society are tried and convicted for tax evasion to
rebut the notion that the offense is comparable to "spitting on the
sidewalk," 27 or that it is condoned or overlooked unless committed
by one of society's outlaws. Gamblers and racketeers account for
only about 10 percent of tax prosecutions; as defendants, they are
outnumbered by doctors, lawyers, and accountants. 28  These statis-
tics, of course, do not prove that gamblers and racketeers have not
been singled out for disproportionate attention by revenue agents;
perhaps they would be even less numerous if their returns were ex-
amined in a completely routine fashion. Even so, it is altogether
too glib to assert that a charge of tax evasion is no more than a
pretext for prosecuting persons whose "real" offense is gambling,
embezzlement, or other illegal activity, or who are reputed to en-
gage in such misconduct. With greater accuracy, it could be said
that to refrain from taxing unlawful receipts would amount to ex-
empting persons from one law because they have violated another.
It is also too glib to assert that taxing the income of unlawful
activities is a losing enterprise for the Treasury, a premise -that is
often used to buttress the conclusion that* punishment, rather than
revenue, is the "true" reason for taxing illegal income. It is obvious
that much business income is routinely reported on tax returns even
though derived from activities that violate a host of regulatory stat-
utes, and there is no evidence that auditing these returns costs more
than the tax attributable to the unlawful activities. Lawyers and
accountants who are familiar with the folkways of professional gam-
blers report that their clients, imbued with a healthy respect for the
Internal Revenue Service, often report substantial amounts of in-
come in order to avoid scrutiny by an agency that is less complaisant
than their local police departments. It is, no doubt, far less com-
mon for embezzlers, corrupt public officials, and burglars to report
their "sporadic loot" or even their steady profits, though a few may
be foresighted enough to do so; and the circle may grow as know-
ledge of the tax danger spreads from one recidivist to another.
27. See note 26 supra.
28. PRESImENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUsTIcE, TAsK FORCE REPORT: CRIME AND ITS IMPACr-AN ASSESSMENT
113 (1967).
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Recipients of unlawful income have an aversion to written re-
cords. This is, of course, an obstacle to the revenue agent who
is investigating a suspected individual's failure to file or auditing a
return that is deficient in details. But lawbreakers often leave a
trail of conspicuous consumption that permits the probable amount
of their income to be estimated by such indirect methods as an
analysis of bank deposits or net worth changes, and once a deficien-
cy is assessed, the taxpayer has the burden of disproving the agent's
computation. At this point, the taxpayer's lack of records hampers
him more than the revenue agent. 29 Though the investigation of
a particular taxpayer receiving unlawful income may cost the Treas-
ury more than it produces, taxpayers who have lived through one
such proceeding are ordinarily more circumspect in fiilng returns in
future years, and every publicized investigation induces a wave of
"voluntary" filings and amended returns .by other taxpayers in the
same occupational class and geographical location.
In the Rutkin case, Mr. Justice Black ventured the "guess that
this one trial has cost United States taxpayers more money than the
Government will collect in taxes from extortioners in the next
twenty-five years." 30 This colorful speculation may be correct so far
as extortioners are concerned, but it does not support the conclusion
that a tax on unlawful income will produce less revenue, measured
on a nationwide basis, than the cost of enforcement. Once the
range of unlawful activities that may give rise to income is taken
into account, a more plausible conclusion is that taxing unlawful in-
come is a profitable enterprise for the Treasury. The cost per dollar
of taxes collected is no doubt much greater than the cost of collect-
ing taxes from employees subject to the wage withholding system,
'but so is the cost of enforcing the income tax in many other areas
(e.g., tips, cash earnings of persons performing household services
and odd jobs, etc.).
But if income from unlawful activities is taxed, will disclosure
of the facts make it impossible for the taxpayer to get a fair trial?
Dissenting in Rutkin, Mr. Justice Black ,argued that the tax evasion
charge in that case was obscured by evidence of the defendant's
criminal history and associations and that "[T]he fantastic story of
supposed extortion . . . would probably never have been accepted
29. For a suggestive illustration of the problem, see James Clifford Rog-
ers, P-H TAx Cr. REP. & MEM. Dac. (43 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.) 1I 74,004 (Jan.
14, 1974).
30. Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130, 141 (1952).
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-by a jury if presented in a trial uncolored by the manifold other
inflammatory matters which took up 887 of the 900 pages in this
'tax evasion' case." 31
Though real enough, the danger to the defendant's right to a
fair trial does not justify a tax exemption for all income from unlawful
activity. To begin with, a tax evasion trial may require only a mini-
mal reference to the defendant's illegal behavior, or even none at
all. If the government's case consists of evidence that the taxpayer
spent more money than his reported income made available to him
and that he had a "likely source" of unreported income from which
the unaccounted-for funds may have come, for example, there is
rarely a need for extensive details about the source, and the judge
can reduce the possibility of prejudice by firm instructions to the
jury. If a public official is charged with deducting the cost of his
daughter's wedding as a business expense, to take another example,
proof that he financed the party with funds received as bribes might
well be excluded as irrelevant. Sometimes, however, more exten-
sive or lurid evidence of the defendant's misconduct is properly
offered by the government or must be introduced by the defendant
himself, and he must rely on the judge, acting under the principles
established by the appellate courts, to exert his authority over the
jury in an effort to insure a fair trial. While the residual risk of
prejudice to the defendant is not trivial, neither is it demonstrably
so substantial that prosecuting persons with income from unlawful
activities on federal tax evasion charges is inconsistent with the fair
administration of justice. Mr. Justice Black himself was prepared
to tolerate the risk of unfairness in the case of bootleggers, profes-
sional gamblers, and other '"businessmen," whose income he re-
garded as subject to tax. And he suggested no reservations about
taxing persons whose income derives from false advertising, black
marketeering, usurious loans, over-ceiling rental charges, and viola-
tions of other regulatory laws, even though juries---especially in ur-
ban centers-may well find these white collar crimes as abhorrent
as extortion and robbery.32
31. Id. at 147.
32. It should also be noted that a disallowance of deductions may entail
proof by the government that the defendant was engaged in activities that a
jury will disapprove. For example, in United States v. Lillehei, 357 F. Supp.
718 (D. Minn. 1973), deductions for "additional professional secretarial and
maid help" were shown by the government to reflect payments to three
women "whose testimony indicated . . . a rather personal relationship with
the defendant." Id. at 724. See also United States v. Windham, 489 F.2d
1389 (5th Cir. 1974) (tax evasion prosecution of physician; held, reference
to abortions not prejudicial).
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I do not suggest that Mr. Justice Black was crying "wolf." The
danger of unfairness is real, and it is more widespread than his
remedy-tax exemption for income derived from sporadic unlawful
activities-implies. If prejudice to the defendant cannot be ade-
quately checked by a searching voir dire before the jury is im-
panelled and by the judge's control of the courtroom, however, it
does not necessarily follow that exempting all illegal income from
tax is the most appropriate remedy. A more limited corrective
would be to abandon the use of criminal sanctions in such cases,
leaving the defendant subject to the normal civil remedies of liabil-
ity for the tax itself, interest, and penalties for negligence or deliber-
ate disregard of the regulations. There would be, of course, a resi-
due of unavoidable prejudice even in civil proceedings, but a regime
of blanket immunity from the rules of government for everyone who
might be treated unfairly by a jury would be intolerable.
Assuming that it is both fair and profitable to tax the profits
of unlawful activities, is it degrading for the government to do so?
Judge Manton, concurring in one of the early bootlegging income
cases, argued that it was:
It is hard to conceive of Congress ever having had in mind
that the government be paid a part of the income, gains,
or profits derived from successfully carrying on this crime,
or entering into a combination with the person engaged
in this unlawful business to ascertain how and to what ex-
tent he shall be taxed. The Criminal Code provides
punishment for those who violate the [National Prohibi-
tion Act] . . . and, if severer punishment should be in-
flicted, it is a matter for Congress to legislate. It is in-
credible to believe that it was intended that a bootlegger
be dignified as a taxpayer for his illegal profit, so that
the government may accept his money for governmental
purposes, as it accepts the money of the honest merchant
taxpayer.83
Though Judge Manton's argument is not necessarily weakened by
his subsequent personal history, an ironic footnote to these remarks
is that he was later convicted of conspiracy to obstruct justice by
accepting bribes to influence his decisions34 and that the Internal
Revenue Service was successful in taxing these receipts to him.85
It is not known whether the government's willingness to accept
money from both Judge Manton and "the honest merchant tax-
33. Steinberg v. United States, 14 F.2d 564, 569 (2d Cir. 1926).
34. United States v. Manton, 107 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1938), cert. denied,
309 U.S. 664 (1940).
35. Martin T. Manton, 17 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 833 (1948).
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payer" served to "dignify" the former or to insult the latter.
Opinions will differ, but I find the Manton theory farfetched
to the point of absurdity. The notion that the government is a
"silent partner" in all profitable activities because it taxes their in-
come is a familiar and sometimes useful figure of speech, but the
relationship entails no moral responsibility for the behavior of the
private member of this fictional partnership. A tax is an enforced
exaction that reduces the profits of the taxed enterprise, and this
no more implies approval than does the confiscation and sale of a
drug peddler's automobile and merchandise by the police. More-
over, as suggested earlier, unlawful income arises not only from
wholly unlawful activities, like bootlegging and embezzlement, but
also from a wide range of activities that could be, but are not con-
ducted in a wholly lawful manner. If taxing income implies moral
responsibility for the activities from which it flows, the government
could preserve its soul only by exempting not only the income of
bootleggers, but also the profits derived from violating the antitrust
laws, charging over-ceiling prices, manufacturing unsafe products,
and misrepresenting the quality of the taxpayer's merchandise.
Finally, Judge Manton's advice turns tax exemption-often a device
to encourage the exempted activity-on its head. It suggests -that
spiritual purity is -to be obtained only by exempting, and hence en-
couraging, the very activity which the government should despise.
To buttress the theory that taxing an unlawful enterprise is de-
grading to the government, Judge Manton asserted that the mere
act of computing a criminal's income is a dirty business.80 If this
income is taxed, he argued, it might be necessary to allow a boot-
legger to deduct any bribes paid by him, in order to comply with
the Congressional intent to tax "net" rather than gross income.
When this issue was raised before the Supreme Court in the Sulli-
van case, Mr. Justice Holmes said:
It is urged that if a return were made the defendant [who
had been convicted of failure to file] would be entitled
to deduct illegal expenses such as bribery. This by no
means follows, but it will be time enough to consider the
question when a taxpayer has the temerity to raise it.87
The Yankee from Olympus may have thought that no mortal tax-
payer would dare to claim that bribes and other illegal payments
were deductible business expenses. The issue was in fact raised in
numerous later cases, however, and the courts gradually developed
36. Steinberg v. United States, 14 F.2d 564, 569 (2d Cir. 1926).
37. United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 264 (1927).
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a distinction between the "legal" expenses of an illegal business
(e.g., salaries and rent) which the taxpayer was allowed to deduct,
and its "illegal" expenses (e.g., bribes and "protection" payments)
which were disallowed. 38
In administering this distinction, close cases were often encount-
ered (e.g., salaries paid to persons who were accessories to the
crime, 39 loss of merchandise confiscated by the police,40 and de-
predation on instrumentalities of crime) which required the gov-
ernment to concern itself with the details of unlawful activities, as
predicted by Judge Manton. But he used a misleading label in de-
scribing the audit process, which is adversary rather than coopera-
tive, as a "combination" between the government and the criminal.
There is, at most, a bit of irony in a revenue agent's bureaucratic
audit of a tax return embracing unlawful income, in the course of
which he must ask for documentation of its receipts and expendi-
tures, separate "legitimate" business expenses from unlawful pay-
ments, determine whether salaries paid to accessories were in keep-
ing with the reasonable value of their services, and so on.
There is, in fact, another irony in this area, which might have
scandalized Judge Manton and titillated Mr. Justice Holmes. Be-
cause the Social Security Act's definition of "income" is taken from
the Internal Revenue Code, a criminal whose activity constitutes a
"trade or business" (e.g., a professional gambler or bootlegger) is
covered by the self-employment tax and evidently becomes entitled,
on retirement, to social security benefits geared to his earnings dur-
ing the last few years of work preceding his retirement.4 1  If there
38. See Comment, Business Expenses, Disallowance, and Public Policy:
Some Problems of Sanctioning with the Internal Revenue Code, 72 YALE L.J.
108 (1962). See also James v. United States, 366 U.S. 313 (1961) (dictum
to effect that repayment of embezzled funds gives rise to deduction); Ray-
mond Mazzei, 61 T.C. No. 55 (Jan. 23, 1974) (taxpayer who invested in a
bogus counterfeiting scheme cannot deduct his outlay on discovering that he
was duped); Herbert E. Tharp, 41 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 21 (1972) (taxpayer
engaged in usurious loan business allowed to deduct uncollectible loans).
For discussion of the subsequent statutory amendments which now domi-
nate, if not preempt, this area, see Taggart, Fines, Penalties, Bribes, and Dam-
age Payments and Recoveries, 25 TAX L. Rav. 611 (1970).
39. Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27 (1958).
40. Fuller v. Commissioner, 213 F.2d 102 (10th Cir. 1954).
41. Rev. Rul. 60-77, 1960-1 CuM. BuLL. 386. In response to an inquiry
to the Social Security Administration regarding the number of persons whose
illegal activities served as a base for social security benefits, I was advised:
The Social Security Administration keeps no records concerning
whether remuneration covered for social security purposes is derived
from legal or illegal activities, nor have any studies in this area been
made. However, our general position in this matter would be the
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is anything to the argument that the government is tainted by taxing
unlawful income, perhaps the payment of these benefits serves as
a purgative.
A final comment on this issue: While I perceive nothing un-
seemly in taxing unlawful income, one might properly object if the
government's tax claim to the lawbreaker's assets was preferred over
the right of his victims to be reimbursed by him for their losses.
In general, however, if the victim can trace and identify his proper-
ty, as in the case of a stolen work of art, he can get it back, even
if the thief has nothing left to pay his taxes. Even if the property
cannot be traced (e.g., cash whose serial numbers are not known),
the victim will ordinarily be familiar with the facts sooner than the
government, and this prior knowledge will usually enable him to
establish an enforceable claim against any assets that can be discov-
ered in the criminal's possession before the government's tax lien
takes hold.4 2 Situations can be imagined in which -the victim's right
to reimbursement will be subordinated to the government's right to
collect taxes on the unlawful income, but they are unusual, and a
corrective for this injustice could be provided by Congress without
going so far as to confer a blanket exemption on unlawful income.43
same as that of the Internal Revenue Service: all remuneration from
employment or self-employment is covered under social security un-
less specifically excepted under Section 209 and 211 respectively of
the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 409 and 411). The legality or
illegality of the activities involved is immaterial.
Letter from Hugh F. McKenna, Director, Bureau of Retirement and Survivors
Insurance, to Boris I. Bittker, July 17, 1973.
42. If the victim has not stimulated an investigation of the wrongdoer by
the Internal Revenue Service, he will ordinarily be interviewed by the revenue
agents, and in either event will have an opportunity to file suit against the
wrongdoer before the government can obtain a tax lien. If the government
is unusually swift in making a jeopardy assessment, or if the victim is not
interviewed by the government because his name is unknown to the investigat-
ing agents, however, his claim may be so belated that it will rank after the
government's.
43. See B. BrrrxKR & L. STONE, supra note 24, at 124. Congress could
protect the victim, for example, by adding his claim against the wrongdoer
to the list of favored claims in INr. REv. CoDE oF 1954, § 6323.
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